100th YEAR OF SARIKAMIS OPERATION
BATTLE OF SARIKAMISH
COMMEMORATIVE BRONZE COIN
TURKEY 2015
PROOF UNCIRCULATED
Metal : Bronze
Diameter : 38.61 mm
Weight : 23.33 gr
Type : Oxide
Edge : Reeded
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TAKEN FROM WIKIPEDIA
Battle of Sarikamish
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Sarikamish
Сражение при Сарыкамыше-Srazhenie pri Sarykamyshe
Sarıkamış Muharebesi |
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| Belligerents |
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| Commanders and leaders |
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| Units involved |
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| Strength |
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| Casualties and losses |
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| Part of Caucasus Campaign of Middle Eastern theatre in World War I |
Russian trenches in the forests of Sarikamish. |
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Russian Empire
Armenian volunteers | Ottoman Empire |
Nikolai Yudenich
Arshak Gafavian
Hamazasp Srvandztyan | Enver Pasha
Hafiz Hakki Pasha |
| Russian Caucasus Army | 3rd Army |
| 60,000[1][2][3] | 118,000[4][notes 1] |
| 16,000 – 30,000 dead, wounded and sick[5][6] | 47,000 – 90,000 dead[7]
7,000 – 50,000 POW[7]
10,000 wounded[7] |
The Battle of Sarikamish (Armenian: Սարիղամիշի ճակատամարտ (Sarighamishi chakatamart), Russian: Сражение при Сарыкамыше; Turkish: Sarıkamış Harekatı) was an engagement between the Russian and Ottoman empires during World War I. It took place from December 22, 1914 to January 17, 1915 as part of the Caucasus Campaign.
The outcome was a Russian victory. The Ottomans employed a strategy which demanded that their troops be highly mobile and to arrive at specified objectives at precise times. This approach was based both on German and Napoleonic tactics.[8]The Ottoman troops, ill-prepared for winter conditions, suffered major casualties in the Allahuekber Mountains.[8]
Afterward, Ottoman leader Enver Pasha publicly blamed his defeat on Armenians and the battle served as a prelude to theArmenian Genocide.[9]
Contents
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Background[edit]
Russia viewed the Caucasus Front as secondary to the Eastern Front and the Eastern Front enjoyed the major share of Russian resources. Russia had taken the fortress of Kars from the Turks during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, when it was incorporated into the militarily administered Kars Oblast, and it now feared a Caucasus Campaign aimed at retaking Kars and the port of Batum. A Caucasus Campaign would have a distracting effect on Russian forces. The plan found sympathy withGerman advisors in that a success in this region would mean a diversion of Russian forces to this front from the Polish and Galician fronts.[6] Germany supplied resources and the Ottoman Third Army was used in the battle.[10] The immediate strategic goal of the Caucasus Campaign was to retake Artvin, Ardahan, Kars, and the port of Batum. As a longer term goal, head of the Ottoman war ministry İsmail Enver hoped a success would facilitate opening the route to Tbilisi and beyond, initiating a revolt of Caucasian Muslims.[6] Another Turkish—or rather German—strategic goal was to cut Russian access to its hydrocarbon resources around the Caspian Sea.[11]
Prelude[edit]
Ismail Enver and Otto von Feldmann inspecting the units
The headquarters of the Ottoman 3rd Army was in Erzurum, under the command of Hasan Izzet. On 30 October 1914, the 3rd Army headquarters was informed by High Command in Constantinople about the Ottoman navy's bombardment of the Russian ports of Novorossiysk, Odessa and Sevastopol in the Black Sea. High Command expected the Russian Army to cross the Ottoman border at any time. The Bergmann Offensive (November 2, 1914 – November 16, 1914) ended with the defeat of Russian troops under Bergmann. The Russian success was along the southern shoulders of the line.[12] Hasan İzzet stabilized the front by letting the Russians 25 kilometres (16 mi) inside the Ottoman Empire along the Erzurum-Sarikamish axis.[12]
The war minister, Ismail Enver, devised an operation plan while he was at the Department of War in Istanbul. His strategy was based on German principles copied from Napoleon.[8] Enver's plan involved a single envelopment using three Corps. On the right flank, XI Corps would fix the Russians in place and conduct feint attacks. In the center, IX Corps would fight in the direction of Sarikamish Pass. Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Hafız Hakkı's X Corps, which was to be on the left flank, would drive to Oltu, cross the Allahuekber Mountains, cut the Kars road, and drive the Russians to the Aras Valley, where the Russian forces would be destroyed by all three Corps attacking in concert. Meanwhile, a detachment unit under Stange Bey would conduct highly visible operations to distract and pin Russian units. Success depended on all troops arriving at their specified objectives at the correct moment.[8] The first part of the plan was fulfilled when the Russians concentrated their forces at Sarikamish and Köprüköy after the Bergmann Offensive.[8]
Hasan İzzet was not in favor of an offensive action in the harsh winter conditions. He was planning to remain in a defensive posture by pulling the Russians to Erzurum Fortress and launching a counterattack. Hafız Hakkı was sent to replace the commander of X Corps to energize the 3rd Army.[12] Enver released Hasan İzzet from command on December 14. İzzet told Enver:
We have to consider 8 or 9 days for a large scaled encircling manoeuvre. However, during this time the XI Corps, which will remain at the front, might be jeopardized. Even if we execute the manoeuvre with two corps, they will probably face difficulties against the enemy.
Enver wanted his plan executed through a winter offense, and decided to take charge. He left Istanbul with General Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf and the head of the Operations Office Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Feldmann. They arrived in Erzurum on December 21. Senior Turkish commanders opposed the forced resignation of Hasan İzzet due to his rejection of the plan.[6]
Battle[edit]
Battlefield[edit]
Ottoman 3rd Army winter gear
The war zone was nearly 1,250-1,500 kilometers (776–932 miles) wide from the Black Sea to Lake Van, which made military concentration difficult.[13] The operation was executed at a plateau averaging 1,500–2,000 meters (5,000–6,500 feet) above sea level. The main difficulty with the region was the roads, with the transportation infrastructure on the Ottoman side far from adequate. Russia's main advantage was the Kars Gyumri Akhalkalaki railway line and a terminal at Sarikamish.[14] The railway was 24 kilometres (15 mi) from the border.[14] The only way for an army to get through the Caucasian heights was the high mountain passes in which lay the cities Kars and Sarikamish. Beyond, the upper valleys of the
